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White v. Lee
No. 00-3, 2000 WL 1803290, at *1
(4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2000)

L Facts
A North Carolina jury convicted Clifton Allen White ("White") of
first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, larceny of an automobile,
robbery with a dangerous weapon, and-second-de;ree burglary. The jury
imposed the death sentence based upon the following agravators: murder
in the commission of a first-degree kidnapping, second-degree burglary,
robbery with a dangerous weapon; and an "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" murder.1 The jury weighed mitigating and agravating factors and
found that the mitigating factors did not outweigh
aggravators. The
jury recommended the imposition of the death penalty. The Supreme
Court of North Carolina affirmed White's conviction and death sentence.'
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.4 White sought collateral relief from the Mecklenburg Superior Court, which denied his request.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina then denied certiorari. White filed
a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the federal district court. The
district court denied the petition. White filed a notice of appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit pursuant to 28
U.S.C. S 2253(c)(2).5
II Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied
White's petition for writ of habeas corpus.6
1. White v. Lee, No. 00-3, 2000 WL 1803290, at *2 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2000); see N.C.
GEN. STAT. §5 15A-2000(e)(5), (9) (2000) (providing two aggravating factors: a capital felony
committed in the commission of a robbery, burglary or kidnapping; and a capital felony
which was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel").
2.
White, 2000 WL 1803290, at *2; see N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(c)(3) (2000)
(requiring jury to find that mitigating circumstances do not outweigh aggravating circumstances prior to imposing death penalty).
3.
State v. White, 471 S.E.2d 593, 596-97 (N.C. 1996).
4. White v. North Carolina, 519 U.S. 936, 936 (1996).
5.
White, 2000 WL 1803290, at *2; see28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1998) (requiring
petitioner to make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right to a federal
appellate court prior to the court granting a certificate of appealability).
6. White, 2000 WL 1803290, at *11.
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III. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Taylor
interpreted the recent amendments to 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) as a substantial
limitation on the federal court's ability to grant a state prisoner's habeas
petition.! A federal court may grant habeas relief for a state prisoner only
if the state court unreasonably applied federal law or the state court decision
was contrary to federal law. The Fourth Circuit applied this standard to
White's five claims for habeas relief, two of which are addressed in this case
note."0 White claimed that the statutory aggravating factor of a "heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" murder was unconstitutionally vague." White also
claimed that his trial attorney violated his Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel because counsel chose to call a psychiatrist
who testified that White had a personality disorder which manifested itself
through habitual lying."
Wbetber the Trial Court'sJury Instruction was Unconstitutionally Vague
A North Carolina statute provides that a jury may impose the death
sentence if the "capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." 3
The Fourth Circuit previously held this language to be unconstitutionally
vague, but permitted a limiting instruction to cure the constitutional
defect.' If the language setting forth an aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague, the statute fails because it does not provide guidance for the
jury to distinguish a murder deserving of capital punishment from other
murders." The trial court provided the jury with a limiting instruction at

-:A.

7.

120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000).

8.
White, 2000WL 1803290, at *3; see William v.Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000)
(interpreting language of 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)); 28 U.S.C. S 2254 (Supp. IV 1998).
9. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d).
10. White's claims for habeas relief are as follows: (1) the trial court's instruction as to
a statutory aggravating factor was unconstitutionally vague; (2) the ineffectiveness of his

counsel violated the Sixth Amendment; (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on
the defense of voluntary intoxication; (4) the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the
mitigation evidence and then rejecting one of the mitigating circumstances; and (5) defendant
should have been allowed to question prospective jurors during voir dire concerning their
beliefs about parole eligibility and the court should have instructed the jury of the impact of
a life sentence. White, 2000 WL 1803290, at *4-10.

11.

Id., at *4.

12.

Id., at *5.

13.

N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(e)(9) (2000) (isting one of the 11 aggravating circum-

stances that may be considered by a sentencing body in a capital sentencing proceeding).
14.
White, 2000 WL 1803290, at *5; see Smith v. Dixon 14 F.3d 956,974 (4th Cir. 1994)
(en banc) (holding that language of S 15A-2000(e)(9) may facilitate imposition of death
penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner and is unconstitutional in the absence of
ting jury instruction).
15.
White, 2000 WL 1803290, at *4; see Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,427-28 (1980)
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sentencing offering definitions of "especially heinous, atrocious, and
cruel."16 The Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected the vagueness
challenge because the limiting instruction narrowed the language of the
statute to prevent the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.1" The
Fourth Circuit held that the Supreme Court of North Carolina's rejection
of the constitutional challenge to the aggravating factor was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of relevant United States Supreme
Court precedent."
The Fourth Circuit also addressed a similar claim of vagueness in Frye
v. Lee. 9 The court in Frye noted that a jury instruction, which attempted
to cure the defect of the vagueness of Section 15A-2000(e)(9), may also be
unconstitutionally vague if the limiting instruction does not provide sufficient guidance to the jury." However, the Fourth Circuit in Frye did not
find the state court's decision contrary to federal law or an unreasonable
application of federal law.21
The Virginia Code provides that a jury may impose the death penalty
if "the [defendant's] conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity
(finding that state's capital sentencing scheme must offer adequate guidance to provide
meaningful basis for distinguishing between murder deserving of the death penalty and other
murders).
16. White, 2000 WL 1803290, at *4.The jury instruction read as follows:
Was this murder especially heinous, atrocious or cruel? In this context "heinous'
means extremely wicked, shocking. 'Atrocious" means outrageously wicked and
vile. "Cruel" means designed to inflict a highi degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even for the enjoyment of, the sufferhig of others. However, it isnot
enough that the murder was heinous, atrocious, and cruel as those terms have
been defined, but this murder must have been especially heinous, atrocious and
cruel, and not every murder is especially so. or this murder to have been
especially heinous atrocious, and cruel any brutality which was involved init
must have exceeded that which isnormally present in any killing, or this killing
must have been a [conscienceless] or pitiless crime which was unnecessarily
torturous to the victim
Id.
17. Id.; see State v. Syriani, 428 S.E.2d 118, 141 (N.C. 1993) (holding that the limiting
instructions cured the unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor).
18. White, 2000 WL 1803290, at *5.
19. Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897,907-08 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the limiting instruction that accompanied the statutory aggravator cured the constitutional vagueness).
20. Id. at 902-03. The Fourth Circuit failed to identify factors by which the jury
instruction may be measured to determine what constitutes sufficient guidance to a jury and
what instructions remain unconstitutionally vague, possibly invoking an arbitrary imposition
ofthe death sentence; seeVA.MODELJURYINSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL No. 33.122 (Lexis Law
Publishing 1999) (providing the precise language of S 19.2-264.4(C) to the jury with the
additional explanation that the conduct be 'beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish
the act of murder").
21. Frye, 235 F.3d at 908.
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of mind or aggravated battery to the victim.' 22 The Supreme Court of
Virginia has repeatedly held that the vileness aggravating factor is not
unconstitutionally vague. 3 The practitioner should continue to argue that
Virginia's vileness statute and corresponding jury instruction remain unconstitutionally vague because the jury has no meaningful basis by which to
distinguish between classes of murders that warrant the death penalty and
those that do not. The Supreme Court of Virginia will probably summarily
dismiss the argument based on precedent, but raising the argument preserves
the issue for federal appeal. The practitioner should also draft alternative
jury instructions other than the Model Jury Instructions in an attempt to
guide the jury more adequately.24

B. Whether Wbite's Counsel's Introduction of Psychiatrist'sTestimony
Amounted to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
White's counsel introduced expert testimony from a psychiatrist who
testified that White has a personality disorder and habitually lies as a result
of his disorder. White argued that this testimony undermined the mitigation testimonr of his remorse, effectively denying him the right to testify
at sentencing. The state court applied the two-part Strickland v. Washington 26 test for a Sixth Amendment violation of the right to effective assistance
of counsel.2' The test requires that a defendant show that his counsel's
representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and
absent the deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability of a
different outcome.28 The state court rejected White's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim because White's trial counsel's decision that the mitigation

22. VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 2000) (requiring the capital sentencing
body to impose alife sentence unless the Commonwealth proved, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant presents a future danger to society or that the conduct of the offense was

vile).
23. See, g., Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 565, 569 (Va. 1999) (rejecting the
argument that the vileness aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague); Turner v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 483, 552 (Va. 1988) (same).
24. See Virginia CapitalCase ClearinghouseVerdict Forms, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 449 (2001);
Melissa A. Ray, "Meaningful GuidanceS: Reforming Virginia's Model jury Instructions on
Videness and FutureDangerousness, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 85, 96 (2000) (offering alternative jury
instructions that further define the elements of vileness).
25.
White, 2000 WL 1803290, at *5.
26. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
27. SeeStricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,694 (1984) (holding that defendant must

show counsel's deficient performance and that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense before a sentence or conviction will be overturned on ineffective assistance of counsel
daim).
28. White, 2000 WL 1803290, at *5 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694).
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testimony offered by the psychiatrist outweighed the negative aspects of the
psychiatrist's testimony was reasonable trial strategy.29
The Fourth Circuit held that the state court's rejection of White's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not amount to an unreasonable
application of federal law or a conclusion contrary to federal law."0 The
court relied upon the language in Stricklandthat requires courts to "indulge
ina strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance."" Trial counsel's decision to present
the expert testimony at sentencing fell within the scope of counsel's trial
strategy and was not unreasonable.32
IV Conclusion
The Williams v. Taylordecision delineated the narrow scope of federal
review of a state prisoner's habeas petition." The Supreme Court of Virginia has held consistently that the vileness aggravator is not unconstitutionally vague. However, the practitioner should tirelessly raise the claim that
the vileness aggravator is unconstitutionally vague because the case may
arise in which the federal courts or the Supreme Court of Virginia may find
that the aggravator does not give proper guidance to the jury. The difficulties of receiving relief due to an unconstitutionally vague statute emphasize
the defense attorney's duty to devote a significant amount of time thoroughly preparing for sentencing to defeat the claim of vileness.
Jeremy P. White

29. Id.
30. Id. (applying the standard set forth in Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523
(2000)); see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
31.
Id. (quoting Strickland,466 U.S. at 689).
32. Id., at *7.
33.
Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (holding that the language of 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) limits
the power of a federal court to grant a state prisoner's habeas petition to instances in which
the state court unreasonably applied federal law or the state court decision was contrary to
federal law).
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